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ABSTRACT
We examine the evolving structure of the U.S. hospital industry since 1970, focusing on how
ownership form influences entry and exit behavior. We develop theoretical predictions based on the
model of Lakdawalla and Philipson, in which for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals differ regarding
their objectives and costs of capital. The model predicts for-profits would be quicker to enter and
exit than not-for-profits in response to changing market conditions. We test this hypothesis using
data for all U.S. hospitals from 1984 through 2000. Examining annual and regional entry and exit
rates,  for-profit  hospitals  consistently  have  higher  entry  and  exit  rates  than  not-for-profits.
Econometric modeling of entry and exit rates yields similar patterns. Estimates of an ordered probit
model of entry indicate that entry is more responsive to demand changes for for-profit than not-for-
profit hospitals. Estimates of a discrete hazard model for exit similarly indicate that negative demand
shifts increase the probability of exit more for for-profits than not-for-profits. Finally, membership
in a hospital chain significantly decreases the probability of exit for for-profits, but not not-for-
profits.
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  The hospital industry historically has been primarily composed of public and not-
for-profit hospitals.  But over the last three decades, the share of both types of hospitals 
has been failing as for-profits have taken over an increasing share of hospital activity (see 
Table 1).  Whether this will usher in changes in the behavior and performance of 
hospitals depends on the extent to which for-profit hospitals behave differently than their 
not-for-profit counterparts.  The purpose of this paper is to focus on one aspect of 
behavior that over the long run can have a considerable effect on an industry’s structure: 
entry and exit decisions. 
  A number of studies have explored differences in the behavior of for-profit and 
not-for-profit hospitals.  They have examined preferences for output (Newhouse,1970), 
costs and efficiency [Lewin et al. (1981), Becker and Sloan (1985), Vitaliano, Toren 
(1996), Zuckerman et al. (1994)], quality [Shortell and Hughes (1988), Keeler, (1992), 
Mark(1996), Sloan et. al (2001)], pricing and market power [Gruber (1994), Lynk (1995), 
Keeler (1999), Gaynor and Vogt (2003)], and provision of uncompensated care [(Norton 
and Staiger,1994), Mann et. al (1995)].  Many of these studies do not find significant 
differences in the behavior of for-profits and not-for-profits, and no consensus has yet 
emerged as to whether ownership type is a major factor behind observed differences 
when they do exist.  A few studies have focused on the behavior of for-profits and not-
for-profits in response to decreases in demand, and here differences do seem to emerge.  
Deily et al. (2000) find that less efficient hospitals were more likely to exit when 
privately owned, and Hansmann et al. (2002) find that over the period 1985-1994 for-
profit hospitals adjusted their capacity more responsively to demand reductions than did 
public or not-for-profit hospitals.   
  The findings of Deily et al. (2000) and Hansmann et al. (2002) are suggestive that 
the exit behavior of for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals differs, and we explore this in 
considerable detail.  We also analyze entry of for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals, 
which has not been previously explored.  Theoretical work by Lakdawalla and Philipson 
(1998) demonstrates that if not-for-profits derive utility from greater quantity then they 
will behave as if they have lower effective costs than for-profits.  This can provide a 
rationale for why not-for-profits appear to be less responsive to demand reductions than 
  1for-profits.  The same logic suggests that not-for-profits would also be quicker to enter in 
response to demand growth, although we discuss how financial factors might impede the 
growth of not-for-profits and make them less responsive to entry opportunities.  To 
explore how for-profit and not-for-profits respond to both growth and decline in demand, 
we examine entry and exit behavior of both types of hospitals at the county level in 
response to demand fluctuations.   
  We implement our analysis by constructing a panel data set for all hospitals over 
the period 1984-2000 that contains information for each hospital on its years of operation, 
location, ownership status, and system membership.  We first examine annual entry and 
exit rates of for-profit and not-for-profits.  These rates are positively correlated, 
suggesting that both types of hospitals responded similarly to market developments.  But 
the annual entry and exit rates of for-profits were consistently higher than those for not-
for-profits, suggesting that for-profits were more responsive to both growth and decline 
in demand.   
We next analyze entry and exit rates at the county level, linking them to 
population changes and also market conditions relating to cost and profitability and to 
certificate-of-need regulations that vary across states.
1 We also control for whether 
hospitals are part of systems.  This might be expected to influence exit behavior based on 
the findings of Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1998) and Disney, Haskel, and Heden 
(2003) regarding differences in exit behavior of manufacturing plants that are and are not 
part of multi-plant firms.  We also test whether entrants had higher rates of exit than 
incumbent firms, as is consistently found for manufacturing firms.  Consistent with our 
findings about overall entry and exit rates, we find that entry as well as exit was more 
responsive to demand changes for for-profits than not-for-profits.  System membership 
also influenced entry and exit rates. Unlike the manufacturing sector, however, entrants 
were not more likely to exit than older, incumbent firms.   
  The paper is organized as follows. Section II contains the economic model 
featuring the Lakdawalla and Philipson theory. It also discusses how the ability of not-
for-profits to expand into growing markets might be constrained by their limited ability to 
raise capital. Section III presents the econometric model and Section IV describes the 
                                                 
1 Certificate of Need regulations are state specific and control the entry and expansion of hospitals. 
  2data. Section V presents the results in three broad subsections. First, changes in the 
structure of the U.S. hospital industry over the last three decades are described. Next 
entry and exit at the national and regional level are analyzed. Then estimates of our 
econometric model are presented. Section VI contains a summary and conclusions. 
 
II. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
  Traditionally, not-for-profits are thought to derive utility from a number of factors 
in addition to profits.  Candidates include the quantity or quality of the services they 
provide, care to the indigent, and physician revenue, among other factors (Newhouse, 
1970; Pauly, 1978; Sloan, 2000).   Lakdawalla and Philipson (1998) posit that not-for-
profits care primarily about two factors: profit and the quantity of services provided.  
This implies a utility function for not-for-profits of U(x,π), where x denotes output and π 
profit. Assuming hospitals choose a level of output that maximizes their utility, the first-
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Profits for a hospital are equal to revenue minus costs, both of which are a function of  
output: 
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Differentiating profits w.r.t. output gives  
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Combining (2) and (4), we get 
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The term on the right-hand-side of equation (5) is the effective marginal cost of a 
not-for-profit.  It equals the traditional marginal cost of production cx minus the implicit 
value not-for-profits place on additional units of output.  For-profit hospitals, in contrast, 
are assumed to care only about profits.  Then Ux equals 0 and the right-hand-side of (2) 
simplifies to cx.  Thus, in effect, not-for-profits have lower marginal costs than for-profits 
because of their preference for output.  This could be attributed to not-for-profits having a 
goal of serving the community, with greater output the vehicle for providing greater 
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2 . An alternative rationale for the lower effective costs of not-for-profits is that 
they are less able or willing than for-profits at preventing their managers from indulging 
their preferences (at the expense of profits).  The inability to discipline managers could 
arise due to the absence of residual claimants in the case of not-for-profits. For-profits, on 
the other hand, have stockholder representatives on the board of directors, who are the 
natural group to discipline managers. 
If indeed not-for-profits have lower marginal costs than for-profits, then it is easy 
to see why for-profits would be the first to exit markets in which both for-profits and not-
for-profits participate.  The same logic suggests that not-for-profits would be the first to 
enter new markets that are growing—they will require a lower price than for-profits to 
enter and thus might be expected to enter before for-profits.
3  Indeed, taken to its 
extreme, this logic questions why for-profit hospitals exist at all.   
One factor that can help explain the existence of for-profits is capital.  If not-for-
profits indulge their preference for output, then they will earn lower profits than for-
profits, and hence earn a lower return on investment.  They will then be at a disadvantage 
in financing their operations unless they have preferential access to capital. Historically, 
this has been the case.  Prior to 1970, not-for-profits raised a considerable amount of their 
capital from philanthropic sources, which provided them with an advantage.  But 
contributions to hospitals peaked in 1965 at $2.1 billion and by 1981 had fallen to $603 
million in constant dollars (Sloan et al, 1990). Not-for-profit hospitals also benefited from 
the federal Hill-Burton act, which subsidized not-for-profit and public hospital 
investment.  The other main advantage of not-for-profits in raising capital stems from 
their ability to qualify as municipal borrowers.  Lenders then do not have to pay federal, 
state, or local tax on interest received, enabling not-for-profit hospitals to issue bonds at 
lower interest rates than for-profits.  Federal tax reform in 1986, however, eliminated 
institutional investors’ deductions of carrying charges for holding tax exempt bonds, 
reducing the spread between taxable and tax exempt bond yields (Grossman et al., 1983).  
In addition, the General Accounting Office reported that by 1990 at least 17 states had 
                                                 
2Not-for-profit hospitals are often referred to as community hospitals, and many of them have the word 
community in their title. 
3 In the Lakdawalla-Phillipson model, the number of not-for-profits is fixed, thus in their model for-profits 
are more likely to enter growing markets. 
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only if they provided charity care (Hassan et al., 2000).  Consequently, in recent years 
not-for-profits have found it increasingly costly to raise capital.   
If not-for-profits have been constrained in their ability to raise capital, then it 
might be expected that for-profits would be more responsive to new opportunities for 
growth. Existing not-for-profits already have capital, and if the capital was raised at 
preferential rates then they might be expected to remain longer in declining markets than 
for-profits in order to indulge their preference for output.  This suggests that for-profits 
might be more responsive both to increases and decreases in demand.  They would be the 
first to enter growing markets and the first to exit declining markets.   
Another factor that might bear on the responsiveness of hospitals to demand 
changes is whether they are part of hospital systems.  Hospitals that are part of systems 
may have lower costs and greater access to capital (Levitz and Brooke, 1985; Carey, 
2003; Cleverley, 1992). Lower costs would enable them to survive longer in declining 
markets and thus be less likely to exit, all else equal.  Lower costs would also enable 
them to enter growing markets more quickly, which would be reinforced by their greater 
access to capital.  This suggests that entrants would be more likely than exiters to be part 
of systems for both for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals.   
  
III. METHODS 
  If all hospitals were identical other than regarding their ownership status, then 
Lakdawalla-Philipson hypothesis suggests that in markets in which both ownership forms 
coexist, for-profit hospitals will always be the marginal firm.  Consequently, in response 
to shifts in demand, for-profits would always enter and exit before not-for-profits
4.  But 
in the presence of heterogeneity, high-cost for-profits might exit before lower-cost not-
for-profits, and similarly not-for-profits might be quicker to capture a particular growth 
opportunity than for-profits.  Accordingly, we test our hypothesis by comparing entry and 
exit rates of for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals. 
  We undertake three types of analyses.  First, we describe broadly how the hospital 
industry has evolved in recent years.  We focus on differences between for-profits and 
                                                 
4 The theory of Lakdawalla and Philipson implies that there is no entry or exit by not-for-profits 
  5not-for-profits, entrants/exiters and incumbent firms, system members and non-members, 
and hospitals in different regions.  We also consider the extent to which trends in the 
hospital industry conform to patterns in other sectors, particularly the manufacturing 
sector, which has been examined extensively using plant-level data. 
Second, we conduct an econometric analysis of entry.  We use an ordered probit 
model to test whether for-profit hospitals are more responsive to changes in the 
profitability of entry than not-for-profit hospitals.  Hospital entries in each county 
between 1984 and 2000 are regressed on a measure of demand shift over the period and a 
number of control variables.  We use changes in the elderly population as our measure of 
exogenous demand shifts.  The elderly are heavy consumers of health care, so growth in 
the elderly population should be highly correlated with growth in the demand for hospital 
services.  In most years, entry in a county is quite low and often zero.  Accordingly, entry 
is coded in four levels—zero, one, two, or three or more.  Separate analyses are 
conducted for for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals.  We expect that the effect of demand 
growth on firm entry will be greater for for-profits. 
  Third, we conduct an econometric analysis of exit.  First, we perform a 
difference-in-differences analysis of exit.  We examine counties with only for-profit 
hospitals, counties with only not-for-profit hospitals, and counties with both types of 
hospitals.  If for-profits are more likely to exit in response to decreases in demand, exit 
rates should be greater for for-profits both in the single ownership counties and in the 
mixed counties.  Furthermore, in the mixed counties the difference between the exit rates 
of for-profits and not-for-profits should be magnified if for-profits are the marginal firm.  
Accordingly, we test whether the difference in exit rates for for-profit and not-for-profit 
hospitals is greater in mixed than single-ownership counties. 
  We also estimate a logit discrete hazard model of exit for each of the years 1985 
to 2000, which allows us to control for other aspects of hospitals than their ownership 
status that might influence exit.  The model takes the form:  
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where Pijt is the probability of hospital i in county j exiting in year t,   contains the 
characteristics of county j at time t, and   contains the characteristics of hospital i at 
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  6time t.  Our key measure of interest in   is the shift in demand, again proxied by the 
log change in elderly population.  As in the ordered probit analysis, we estimate the 
model separately for for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals.  Because we are interested in 
testing whether for-profit hospitals are marginal, we examine only those counties in 
which both for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals operate.  If for-profit hospitals are more 
sensitive to changing demand conditions, we expect the marginal effect of the demand 
shift variable to be greater for for-profit than not-for-profit hospitals. 
jt X
  We also estimate one additional model of exit for counties and years in which at 
least one exit occurred and for-profit, not-for-profit, and government hospitals were all 
operating in the county for that year.  For each such county-year, we analyze the 
probability that the exit is by a for-profit, not-for-profit, or government hospital, and how 
these probabilities vary according to changes in demand.  If for-profits are more sensitive 
to demand conditions, then exiters should be more likely to be for-profits in counties in 
which demand is falling than in counties in which it is increasing.  We model the 
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where PFP is the probability of a for-profit exit (PNFP and PGVT are the analogous 
probabilities for not-for-profits and government hospital exits respectively), Xjt are 
characteristics of county j at time t, and βFP,  βNFP, and βGVT are coefficients for the 
respective three types of hospitals.  We perform similar analyses for not-for-profit and 




We use data from three sources. First, we use data on U.S. hospital characteristics 
collected in an annual survey by the American Hospital Association (AHA). Some of this 
information that we use comprises bed size, inpatient days, length of stay, services 
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electronic form from the National Bureau of Economic Research, which provides 
complete information for 1985 to 2000 and partial information for even-numbered years 
from 1970 to 1984.  We have entry exit information only from 1984-2000 and system 
membership information from 1985. Thus entry exit analysis is over 1984-2000. (The 
econometric analysis of exit, which requires system membership information, is from 
1985). Second, we use the Area Resource File (ARF), and U.S.Census data which 
provide measures at the county level for population, elderly population and per-capita 
income.  Third, we use data on hospital system membership compiled from multiple 
sources by Professors Daniel Kessler and Kristin Madison (Madison, 2004). While the 
AHA survey contains extensive year-by-year information on hospital system membership 
status, it contains some internal inconsistencies and also does not conform to the 
information in other sources containing merger acquisition data, such as Modern 
Healthcare, a hospital trade publication. We use a corrected system database created by 
Kessler and Madison for the years 1985-1998. For the years 1999 and 2000 we modified 
and extended their algorithm to create our own system membership database. We also use 
hospital wage index data from Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and 
information on certificate of need laws from American Health Planning Association. 
B. Market Definition 
The product market we analyze is all short term hospital services. Our sample 
comprises all hospitals over the years 1970-2000 serving this product market. To meet 
our market definition a hospital must: 
•  List one of the following as its primary service offered: (1) general 
medical/surgical services; (2) obstetrics/gynecology; (3) eye-ear-nose-throat; (4) 
rehabilitation; or (5) all four of these categories for treatment of children  
•  Have an average length of stay below thirty days, and if it has a long-term-care 
unit then that unit should account for a minority of its admissions. 
•  Not be a federal hospital. 
Because the market for hospital services is local and much of the data we use are 
organized at the county level, we use the county as our geographic unit of analysis.  After 
eliminating counties in Alaska and Hawaii, our final sample comprises 3,070 counties.  






A. Descriptive Analysis 
1. Industry Structure across Ownership Types 
  Table 1 lists the annual number of total and public, not-for-profit, and for-profit 
hospitals from 1970 to 2001.  The total number of hospitals fell steadily, and by 2001 
there were 13% less hospitals than in 1970.  Much of this decline is accounted for by 
public hospitals.  From 1978 to 2001 both the total number of hospitals, and the number 
of public hospitals fell every year, and there were 29% less public hospitals in 2001 than 
1970.  The number of not-for-profit hospitals also declined by 10% from 1970 to 2001.  
In contrast, the number of for-profit hospitals increased by 7% from 1970 to 2001.  Table 
2 further illustrates the rise of the for-profit sector.  In contrast to public and not-for-profit 
hospitals, for-profit hospitals have experienced growth in establishments, capacity, and 
output and have increased their share of all three measures since 1970. 
  The US hospital industry has experienced substantial consolidation in recent 
years, including a considerable increase in the proportion of hospitals that are part of 
multi-hospital systems.  Figure 2 indicates that since 1985 over 80% of for-profit 
hospitals are part of systems, and the trend has been rising over time.  System 
membership for not-for-profits is lower, around 40% as of 1985, but it too has been 
growing, and by 2000 59% of not-for-profit hospitals were part of systems.  Figure 1 
indicates that the average for-profit system contains three times as many hospitals as the 
average not-for-profit system. 
  Figure 2 reports the proportions of for-profit and not-for-profit entrants and 
exiters that are system members.  We predicted a larger percentage of entrants than 
exiters would be system members.  Consistent with this prediction, the percentage of 
entrants that are system members is 67% for for-profits and 62% for not-for-profits 
whereas only 42% and 47% of for-profit and not-for-profit exiters respectively are system 
  9members.  The difference for for-profits is significant at the .01 level whereas the not-for-
profit difference is not significant at conventional levels.
5  Among the for-profit entrants 
that were part of systems, 36% entered markets already containing members of the same 
hospital system.  The comparable percentage for not-for-profit hospitals was much higher 
at 61%.  
  Figure 3 examines mean bed sizes across entrants, exiters, and incumbents for 
various ownership types. Not-for-profit hospitals are larger than for-profit hospitals.  
They have an average of 188 beds versus 132 beds for for-profits. Not surprisingly, 
entrants and exiters are smaller than incumbents, and differences in their sizes according 
to ownership type are smaller.  Among entrants, the average bed size of not-for-profits is 
63 versus 59 for for-profits, and among exiters the respective values are 92 and 76.  The 
latter difference for exiters was significant at the .05 level whereas the difference for 
entrants was not.   
2. Entry and Exit at the National and Regional Levels 
  Table 3 indicates that over the period 1984-2000, annual entry and exit rates were 
1.5% and 1.3% higher for for-profit than not-for-profit hospitals.  Figure 4 indicates that 
the entry rates of for-profit and not-for-profits varied similarly over time.  In 10 of 15 
years they moved together and had a correlation coefficient of 0.5.  Similarly, exit rates 
of for-profits and not-for-profits varied together.  In 9 of 15 years they moved in the same 
direction and had a correlation coefficient of 0.6. This suggests that both for-profits and 
not-for-profits react similarly to changing market conditions, although the degree of 
reaction is uniformly smaller for not-for-profits.  
  In manufacturing industries, entrants typically have higher exit rates than 
incumbent firms (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1988).  Since for-profits have higher 
entry rates than not-for-profits, their higher exit rate could merely be due to hospital 
entrants having a higher exit rate than incumbent hospitals.  To check this, Table 4 
reports the proportion of entrants and incumbents as of 1984 that exited by the year 2000 
separately for public, not-for-profit, and for-profit hospitals.  There was no difference in 
these exit rates for public and not-for-profits.  In contrast, for for-profits, the exit rate was 
                                                 
5 The difference existed at 10% level however, indicated that some of the advantages of system 
membership made a difference in terms of not-for-profit survivability also 
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profits than not-for-profits was not driven by the higher entry rate of for-profits.  It is a 
strikingly different pattern than has been observed in manufacturing industries. 
  We suspect this difference between the hospital and manufacturing industries 
reflects the local character of hospital services.  Many manufacturing firms service 
national markets, whereas hospitals have to be located close to their consumer base.  
Over the eighties and ninties,, population shifted from central cities to suburbs and from 
the Northeast to the West and South.  Consequently, incumbents tended to be located in 
declining markets, whereas entrants were located in growing markets.  If for-profits were 
more likely to enter in response to growth opportunities, then for-profit entrants were 
especially likely to be located in growth markets.  This could explain why the difference 
in the exit rates of incumbents and entrants was particularly pronounced for the for-
profits and why these patterns were so different from the manufacturing sector. 
  Table 5 disaggregates the data on number of hospitals, entry, and exiters by 
ownership type into the nine Census divisions.  In all regions except New England, for-
profits have higher entry and exit rates than not-for-profits. Almost half the total entries 
in the for-profit sector from 1984 to 2000 were in the West South Central region, which 
also experienced the highest number of exits.
6 The largest increase in the number of for-
profit establishments occurred in the Mountain region, which experienced the highest 
regional growth in the overall and elderly populations of 50% and 90% respectively. New 
England, Middle Atlantic and East North Central had some of the lowest increases in 
total and elderly population among the census divisions. They also had the lowest levels 
of for-profit entries. The muted for-profit entry in the Pacific region, in spite of high 
population growth, was probably due to the prevalence of the managed care industry. 
  The correlation coefficient between number of for-profit entrants and exiters 
across census regions is 0.9. Since this is not due to exiting entrants, the high correlation 
is likely attributable to population shifts within the same census region. For-profit 
marginality predicts that for-profits would follow demand shifts to a greater degree than 
not-for-profits and thus would experience a higher correlation between entry and exit 
                                                 
6  West South Central comprises the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas 
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profits is almost negligible at 0.08. 
B. Econometric Analysis of Entry  
  The conceptual model predicts that for-profit firms should be more nimble in their 
response to changing market circumstances.  Following a positive demand shift, for-
profit should disproportionately enter, and following a negative demand shift, for-profit 
firms should disproportionately exit.  To test this prediction, we need a measure of 
demand shift.  Measures of quantity are obviously endogenous.  Given the local nature of 
the hospital market, a natural proxy for demand shift is the change in the local 
population.  To analyze the primary determinants of demand shifts, we estimated a cross 
sectional regression for changes in local hospital capacity.  The dependent variable is 
changes in log hospital beds
7 at the Health Service Area (HSA) level over the period 
1980 to 2000.
8  Table 6 reports the estimated effects of the explanatory variables in the 
regression.  The strongest predictor of changes in hospital capacity is the change in the 
elderly population.  This is to be expected given that about 60% of hospital services is 
delivered to the elderly, the elderly have been growing as a proportion of the population, 
and there has been a significant geographic reallocation of the elderly population in 
recent years.  Accordingly, we use log change in elderly population as our primary 
measure of demand shift. 
  Table 8 reports estimates from the ordered probit analysis of for-profit and not-
for-profit entry at the county level.
9  Both types of hospital entry are positively and 
significantly related to log of total population in 1980 and log change in elderly 
population over 1980-2000.  States with certificate of need (CON) laws regulate hospital 
entry to avoid overbedding and duplication of services.  Using data from the American 
Health Planning Association, we included a dummy for states with certificate of need 
                                                 
7 The correlations between capacity and other quantity measures such as admissions and days are all greater 
than 0.9 
8 HSA is a geographic area consisting of one or more contiguous counties, previously designated by the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for health planning on a regional basis 
9 We examined the sensitivity of these results to the geographic market definition and the choice of demand 
proxy.  We replicated all of the estimations reported here for a different geographic market definition, the 
HSA. The results were qualitatively the same when it came to entry. Exit results however, were sensitive to 
the choice of geographic markets.  We examined the effects of using levels and growth for the total 
population instead of the elderly population as demand proxies.  The results were not sensitive to the use of 
these different demand proxies. 
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growth has a positive but insignificant effect on not-for-profit entry, but a negative and 
marginally significant effect on for-profit entry.  This is opposite of what we would have 
expected for for-profits. Both for-profit and not-for-profit entry are negatively related to 
hospital wages, which comprise a major component of hospital costs
10.  
The main prediction of the conceptual model is that for-profits will be more 
responsive to changes in demand than not-for-profits.  Consistent with this prediction, the 
estimated coefficient of the log change in the elderly population is 1.14 for for-profits and 
0.39 for not-for-profits, and this difference is significant at 5% level.  Since the ordered 
probit model is non-linear, it is more appropriate to look at the marginal effect of the 
demand shift on the expected number of entries.  Similar to the coefficient estimates, the 
marginal effect of the log change in the elderly population is almost three times larger for 
for-profits than not-for-profits.  If elderly population in the average county in the year 
2000 was 1% above its existing level, our estimates imply that expected for-profit 
hospital entry would have been higher by 3.3% and expected not-for-profit hospital entry 
by 1.1%  
C. Econometric Analysis of Exit 
Earlier we reported that for-profits generally had higher annual exit rates than not-
for-profits, which is consistent with for-profits being the marginal firms.  The conceptual 
model also implies that the difference between for-profit and not-for-profit exit rates 
should be more pronounced in markets where both ownership types are present.  To 
understand why, consider a market with two hospitals that experiences a negative 
demand shift sufficient to force one of the hospitals to exit.  In a market with two for-
profit (not-for-profit) hospitals, the exiting firm must be a for-profit (not-for-profit).  
Thus, in uniform ownership markets, the exit rates for the two types are the same, 50%.  
But in a market with one for-profit and one not-for-profit, if the for-profit is the marginal 
firm, then it will be the exiter.  Therefore, in the mixed market the for-profit exit rate is 
100% and the not-for-profit exit rate is 0%. 
                                                 
10 A hospital wage index is included in the regression (www.cms.gov). However, it is imperfectly 
measured.  Wage indices are available only at the MSA level. For non-MSA areas, every state has a single 
rural wage index covering every non-MSA county. Due to changes in MSA definition, we take the wage 
indices over 1990-2000.  Per capita income change is over 1980 and 2000. However, the correlation 
between base period wage index and per capita income is 0.53 
  13Obviously, because hospitals are heterogeneous we will not see such a dramatic 
difference, but this does suggest an estimation method.  We can estimate the marginality 
of for-profit hospitals by taking the difference between for-profit and not-for-profit exit 
rates in mixed ownership markets and subtracting the difference between for-profit and 
not-for-profit exit rates in uniform ownership markets.  If for-profits are marginal, this 
measure should be positive.  
We tabulate exit rates by ownership type, demand growth, and uniform vs. mixed 
ownership markets in Tables 9 and 10.  Table 9 breaks counties into four groups 
according to the quartile of overall population growth while Table 10 breaks counties into 
four groups according to the quartile of elderly population growth.  Within each of these 
four groups, the counties are further subdivided into counties with for-profit but without 
not-for-profit hospitals (“only for-profit”), counties with not-for-profit but without for-
profit hospitals (“only not-for-profit”), and counties with both for-profit and not-for-
profit hospitals.
11  For each of these twelve sets of counties we tabulate exit rates for both 
for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals.  For example, Table 9 indicates that for counties in 
the lowest population growth quartile for which both for-profit and not-for-profit 
hospitals are present, exit rates were 0.46% for for-profits and 0.21% for not-for-profits.   
The final column of the tables present the “difference in differences” estimates of 
the marginality of for-profit firms.  For example, the entry in the difference column for 
Quartile 1 of Table 9 is calculated as ( ) ( ) 14 . 0 31 . 0 21 . 0 46 . 0 08 . 0 − − − = .  This estimate is 
positive in all eight cases in the two tables, with five of the eight differences significant at 
conventional levels.  Consistent with the theory, for-profit hospitals are not only more 
likely to exit,: they are especially more likely to exit when they are in mixed ownership 
markets. 
The model further predicts that in markets with both for-profits and not-for-
profits, exit is more sensitive to demand shifts for for-profits than not-for-profits. To test 
this prediction, we use the logistic discrete hazard model described earlier.  Means and 
standard deviations for the variables used in the hazard model are reported in Table 11.  
Only county-years in which both for-profits and not-for-profits are considered.  Separate 
hazard equations were estimated for the for-profits and not-for-profits.  Estimates are 
                                                 
11 Counties without either for-profit or not-for-profit hospitals are omitted 
  14reported in Table 12 for the marginal effects of county and hospital characteristics on the 
probability of exit for each group of hospitals.  
  A comparison of coefficient estimates from the two logistic regressions reveals 
that lower growth of the elderly population increases the probability of exit for both for-
profit and not-for-profit hospitals. However, the estimated effect for for-profits of -0.017 
is more than twice as large as the estimated effect for not-for-profits of -0.008, as for-
profit marginality would predict. System membership significantly decreases the 
probability of for-profit exit but does not affect the probability of not-for-profit exit. The 
effect of hospital wages is almost twice as large for for-profits than not-for-profits. For 
both groups, the existence of a certificate of need law does not have a significant effect 
on the probability of exit.  
  It is possible that the difference in for-profit and not-for-profit responsiveness 
reported in Table 12 is due to differences in the distribution of characteristics among 
hospitals rather than the propensity to exit.  To address this, we take the estimates from 
Table 12 and apply them “out of sample” to the dataset for the opposite ownership type.  
The results of this exercise are reported in Table 13. If we take the estimates for the for-
profit exit model and apply them to the data for the not-for-profit hospitals, we obtain an 
average exit probability of 0.037 and a marginal effect of the demand shift variable on 
exit of -0.043.  Applying the not-for-profit model to this same not-for-profit data yields 
an average exit probability of 0.008 with a marginal effect of -0.01.  So, standardizing on 
the not-for-profit dataset, the marginal effect of a shift in demand on the exit rate is more 
than four times larger for for-profits than not-for-profits.  The difference between for-
profit and not-for-profit responsiveness to demand shifts remains whether we standardize 
on the for-profit data, the not-for-profit data, or a dataset pooling the two. 
  Our tests focus only on differences between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals.  
To see whether the differential response is affected by the presence of a public hospital in 
a county, we incorporate public hospitals into our analysis. Three sets of coefficient 
parameter estimates, one for each type of hospital ownership, are presented in Table 14. 
Our main conclusions are robust to the presence of public hospitals in our model. High 
growth in elderly population, system membership, and low wage growth all significantly 
decrease the probability of for-profit exit.  
  15In our final analysis, we consider county-years in which an exit occurred and in 
which for-profit, not-for-profit, and public hospitals were all present.  We employ a 
multinomial logit model in order to analyze the probability of these exits being of a for-
profit, not-for-profit, or public hospital.  The conceptual model predicts that for-profits 
will have the highest exit rate and that the probability of the exit being for-profit (relative 
to the other two forms) will be decreasing in demand shifters.  The coefficient estimates 
of the model are presented in Table 15. The probability that a given exiting hospital will 
be for-profit (in markets containing all three types) is over 70%.  This probability is very 
responsive to the demand shift variable:  in markets with growing elderly population, the 
probability that an exiting hospital is for-profit is dramatically reduced (the marginal 
effect of log elderly population growth on the probability of for-profit status is -0.52, 
p<0.05). Existence of a certificate of need law also reduces the probability of for-profit 
exit at 10% level.  Finally, the probability that the exit is not-for-profit is higher for high 
elderly population growth markets (p<0.1). 
    
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
  Our objective in this paper has been to examine the evolving structure of the U.S. 
hospital industry, in particular the ways in which ownership form influences entry and 
exit behavior.  We test whether for-profits are the marginal firms in the hospital industry 
regarding both entry and exit.  Our findings support this hypothesis. For-profits have 
higher entry rates than not-for-profits, and for-profit entry rates are more sensitive to 
demand shifts than not-for-profit.  Furthermore, for-profits have higher exit rates than  
not-for-profit firms, and for-profit exit rates are more sensitive to demand shifts than  not-
for-profits.  Finally, the difference between for-profit and not-for-profit exit rates is 
greater in markets in which both ownership types are present.  All these results are 
consistent with the theory of for-profit marginality.  We thus find evidence that there are 
significant differences between for-profits and not-for-profits in responsiveness to 
demand and that this affects the way that hospital market structure has evolved in the 
U.S.  
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Figure : 2 
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Table I.   No. of hospital establishments 
   Public  Not-for-profit For-profit  Total   
1970 1618  3332  746  5696 
1972 1695  3279  704  5678 
1974 1731  3334  739  5804 
1976 1743  3318  717  5778 
1978 1792  3340  757  5889 
1980 1783  3302  715  5800 
1982 1716  3312  756  5784 
1984 1618  3326  795  5739 
1985 1573  3326  805  5704 
1986 1518  3301  830  5649 
1987 1502  3260  820  5582 
1988 1491  3229  794  5514 
1989 1458  3209  778  5445 
1990 1438  3177  762  5377 
1991 1420  3153  746  5319 
1992 1386  3148  727  5261 
1993 1380  3127  730  5237 
1994 1360  3103  746  5209 
1995 1334  3056  784  5174 
1996 1315  3008  788  5111 
1997 1251  2970  825  5046 
1998 1205  2994  823  5022 
1999 1188  2991  794  4973 
2000 1153  2999  802  4954 
2001 1150  2981  800  4931 
% change over (1970-2000)  -28.92 -10.53  7.24 -13.43 
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Table  2a  Percentage changes in output, capacity and no. of establishments 
  % change over 1970-1985  % change over 1985-2000 
   No. of estb.  Beds  Inpatient Days  No. of estb.  beds  Inpatient Days 
Public  -7.2 -12.1  -25.1  -26.7  -35.9  -37.2 
Not-for-profit  1.4 10.8  -4.3  -9.8  -21.1  -24.7 
For-profit  14.3 85.7  41.0  -0.4  5.2  12.6 
 
Table 2b Change in proportion of output, capacity and no. of establishments 
  Share in 1985 (% terms)  Share in 2000 (% terms) 
   No. of estb.  Beds  Inpatient Days  No. of estb.  beds  Inpatient Days 
Public  27.6 18.2  17.2  23.3  14.7  14.1 
Not-for-profit  58.3 71.0  74.0  60.5  70.8  73.0 
For-profit  14.1 10.8  8.8  16.2  14.4  12.9 
 Table 3:      Entry and exit of For-profit and Not-for-profit hospitals 
        Entries Exits Incumbents
              For-profit Not-for-profit For-profit Not-for-profit   For-profit Not-for-profit
1984                    23 17 22 25 795 3326
1985              15 (1.89) 16 (0.48) 18 (2.77) 27 (0.75) 805 3326
1986              10 (1.24) 7 (0.21) 28 (2.24) 23 (0.81) 830 3301
1987              12 (1.45) 13 (0.39) 28 (3.37) 52 (0.70) 820 3260
1988              20 (2.44) 18 (0.55) 14 (3.41) 27 (1.60) 794 3229
1989              4 (0.50) 3 (0.09) 17 (1.76) 27 (0.84) 778 3209
1990              11 (1.41) 6 (0.19) 21 (2.19) 21 (0.84) 762 3177
1991              9 (1.18) 2 (0.06) 20 (2.76) 22 (0.66) 746 3153
1992              9 (1.21) 9 (0.29) 10 (2.68) 21 (0.70) 727 3148
1993              16 (2.20) 5 (0.16) 7 (1.38) 14 (0.67) 730 3127
1994              17 (2.33) 7 (0.22) 6 (0.96) 11 (0.45) 746 3103
1995              10 (1.34) 1 (0.03) 16 (0.80) 14 (0.35) 784 3056
1996              10 (1.28) 5 (0.16) 11 (2.04) 19 (0.46) 788 3008
1997              16 (2.03) 3 (0.10) 16 (1.40) 7 (0.63) 825 2970
1998              20 (2.42) 9 (0.30) 21 (1.94) 31 (0.24) 823 2994
1999              15 (1.82) 12 (0.40) 9 (2.55) 21 (1.04) 794 2991
2000              16 (2.02) 6 (0.20) 8 (1.13) 25 (0.70) 802 2999
Total            233 (1.75)  139 (0.26) 272 (2.04)  387  (0.73)        
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Public  1618 180  11.1  29  4  13.8 
non-profit  3326 340  10.2  139 15  10.8 
for-profit  795 222  27.9  233 26  11.2 






















Table 5 : Entry and exit of hospitals at the census division level over 1984-2000 
Division  hospitals in 84  Entries: 84-00  Exits: 84-00  Entry Rates  Exit Rates 
  FP NFP  FP  NFP FP NFP  FP NFP FP  NFP 
New  England  3  227  5  3 0 22  167 1 0  10 
Mid  Atlantic  32  527  5  6  16 41  16 1  50 8 
East North Central  14  695  8  6  7  86  57  1  50  12 
West North Central  35  450  18  17  15  51  51  4  43  11 
South  Atlantic  179  421  34  21 38  43  19  5 21 10 
East South Central  124  183  16  6  25  30  13  3  20  16 
West  South  Central  217  276  110  36 94  57  51 13 43 21 
Mountain  35  208  19  18 16  23  54  9 46 11 
Pacific  156  339  18  26 61  34  12  8 39 10 
Note: The totals in 1984 and 2000 do not tally with entry and exit since these also include conversions; FP 
refers to for-profit hospitals and NFP refers to not-for-profit hospitals. Rates calculated over the same time 
period 
  28Table 6: Predictors of log change in hospital capacity in a HSA 
Variable coefficient  Std Error   P value 
           
Intercept -0.384  0.037  0.000 
Lnpopgrowth 0.089  0.080  0.262 
lnelderlypopgrowth 0.390  0.078  0.000 
lnpop70 -0.223  0.113  0.049 
lnpop80 0.235  0.115  0.042 
div1 -0.125  0.059  0.035 
div2 0.051  0.047  0.280 
div3 -0.117  0.035  0.001 
div5 0.083  0.039  0.033 
div6 0.183  0.039  0.000 
div7 0.059  0.034  0.084 
div8 -0.001  0.042  0.980 
div9 -0.010  0.048  0.831 
Con law  -0.061  0.025  0.016 
Note:  
1.  Adj. R-Sq 0.29 
2. obs=800 
3.  growth rates are taken over 1980-2000 
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Table 7: Summary Statistics at county level       
 Mean Standard  Deviation
For-profit entry  0.08  0.49 
Not-for-profit entry  0.05  0.29 
For-profit exit  0.09  0.74 
Not-for-profit exit  0.13  0.58 
pop70 65786.55  230869.60 
pop80 73308.18  238386.50 
pop00 91013.37  295386.50 
lnpop80 10.12  1.32 
Popgrowth 17.63  37.08 
Logpopgrowth 0.13  0.26 
aged70 6834.16  22284.65 
aged80 8288.13  26153.30 
aged00 11324.72  32998.45 
Elderlypopgrowth 33.72  47.03 
Ln elderlypopgrowth  0.25  0.28 
Logagedgr70 0.17  0.10 
Proportion of elderly80  0.13  0.04 
Proportion of elderly00  0.14  0.04 
Pcy80 7716.14  1788.58 
Pcy96 19114.34  4519.51 
lnage80 8.05  1.23 
lnpcy80 8.92  0.23 
Logpcygrowth 0.83  0.21 
Lnwage80 9.02  0.13 
Lnwagegrowth 0.04  0.05 
Note: No. of observations is 3070 
 
Table: 8  Ordered Probit estimation of hospital entry in a county 
 For-profit hospital     Not-for-profit hospital 
  coefficient  std. error  p value  Coefficient  std. error  p value 
Log elderlypopgrowth  1.140            0.227 0.000 0.394 0.240 0.100
lnpop80          0.794  0.063  0.000 0.574 0.059 0.000
lnpropelderlypop80              0.296 0.175 0.092 0.373 0.194 0.055
lnpcy80          0.043  0.345  0.900 0.594 0.367 0.106
Logpcygrowth            -0.665  0.349 0.057 0.139 0.350 0.691
Lnwage80          -1.699  0.701  0.015 0.187 0.709 0.792
Lnwagegr          -2.719  1.090  0.013 -2.501 1.129 0.027
Con            -0.205  0.159 0.199 -0.222 0.160 0.164
div1            -0.226  0.347 0.515 -0.732 0.379 0.053
div2            -1.010  0.314 0.001 -1.085 0.318 0.001
div3            -0.789  0.262 0.003 -0.912 0.266 0.001
div5            -0.071  0.225 0.754 -0.255 0.233 0.275
div6            0.177  0.241 0.462 -0.117 0.273 0.670
div7            0.514  0.198 0.009 0.255 0.197 0.195
div8            -0.181  0.267 0.498 -0.023 0.252 0.927
div9            -0.508  0.299 0.090 -0.223 0.268 0.406
LR Chi square   480.75      351.10     
Log  Likelihood          -435.15 -347.75 
No  of  Observations            3070 3070
 
 
  31Table 9         Exit rates across different quartiles of population growth 
 Quartile 1  # counties  # for-prof  #nonprof   FP exit rate  NFP exit rate  difference 
Both types present  20  28  95  0.46  0.21   
only for-profit  31  35     0.31     0.08 
only non-profit  306     574     0.14   
                   
                   
 Quartile 2  # counties  # for-profit  #nonprofit   FP exit rate  NFP exit rate   
Both types present  44  76  232  0.36  0.14   
only for-profit  47  58     0.12     0.20*** 
only non-profit  341     682     0.11   
                   
                   
 Quartile 3  # counties  # for-profit  #nonprofit   FP exit rate  NFP exit rate   
Both types present  63  168  280  0.41  0.13   
only for-profit  66  76     0.22     0.14** 
only non-profit  326     612     0.08   
                   
                   
 Quartile 4  # counties  # for-profit  #nonprofit   FP exit rate  NFP exit rate   
Both types present  100  280  366  0.30  0.12   
only for-profit  66  84     0.18     0.06 
only non-profit  288     479     0.06   
                   
Note: 
Exit rates are calculated by dividing no. of exits by no. of hospitals in the base year 
Quartiles 1-4 denote an ascending order in terms of population growth 
*    denotes 10% level of significance 
**   denotes 5% level of significance 





Table 10       Exit rates across different quartiles of elderly population growth 
        Difference 
 Quartile 1  # counties  # for-profit  #nonprofit   FP exit rate  NFP exit rate   
Both types present  27  50  146  0.48  0.18   
only for-profit  47  54     0.28     0.23** 
only non-profit  249     408     0.20   
                   
                   
 Quartile 2  # counties  # for-profit  #nonprofit   FP exit rate  NFP exit rate   
Both types present  42  90  243  0.38  0.15   
only for-profit  33  40     0.18     0.15** 
only non-profit  341     709     0.09   
                   
                   
 Quartile 3  # counties  # for-profit  #nonprofit   FP exit rate  NFP exit rate   
Both types present  47  147  228  0.40  0.13   
only for-profit  65  74     0.30     0.04 
only non-profit  374     721     0.06   
                   
                   
 Quartile 4  # counties  # for-profit  #nonprofit   FP exit rate  NFP exit rate   
Both types present  111  265  356  0.29  0.12   
only for-profit  65  85     0.07     0.17*** 
only non-profit  297     509     0.07   
                   
Exit rates are calculated by dividing no. of exits by no. of hospitals in the base year 
Quartiles 1-4 denote an ascending order in terms of population growth 
*    denotes 10% level of significance 
**   denotes 5% level of significance 
 ***denotes 1% level of significance
Note: 




Table 11          Summary Statistics for exit estimation   
 mean Standard  deviation 
Exit 0.01  0.12 
pop80 1479362.00  2092282.00 
pop00 1873384.00  2576215.00 
aged80 154878.50  212309.60 
aged00 201579.40  255857.40 
Exit 0.01  0.12 
System 0.66  0.47 
pcy00 25454.21  6094.43 
pcy80 10116.62  1822.70 
wage91 10127.54  1564.16 
wage01 10104.23  1605.76 
lnpop80 13.33  1.40 
Ln elderlypopgrowth  0.36 0.26 
Prop. Aged  0.11  0.04 
Ln propaged  -2.24  0.31 
Lnpopgrowth 0.26  0.24 
lnpcy80 9.20  0.19 
Lnpcygrowth 0.78  0.18 
Lnwage80 9.21  0.15 
Lnwagegrowth 0.002  0.05 
No. of observations 22818     
Note: Our dependent variable is exit which can be 0 or 1 
 
 Table 12 Marginal effects on probability of hospital exit (for-profit and not-for-profit) 
  For-profit exit  Not-for-profit exit 
Variable  Marginal effect  Std. Err.  p value  Marginal effect  Std. Err.  p value 
Ln propelderlypop80  0.005 0.005        0.328 -0.005 0.003 0.142
Ln pop80  0.002            0.001 0.099 0.001 0.001 0.430
Ln elderlypopgrowth  -0.017            0.006 0.003 -0.008 0.004 0.031
System Membership  -0.050            0.007 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.693
Con law  0.004            0.003 0.280 0.003 0.002 0.222
Lnwg80  -0.004            0.016 0.795 -0.002 0.009 0.805
Lnwagegrowth  0.043            0.025 0.085 0.023 0.012 0.062
Lnpcy80  -0.005            0.007 0.452 0.002 0.005 0.729
Lnpcyrgrowth  0.014            0.007 0.044 0.000 0.004 0.962
Div2*  -0.009            0.004 0.012 -0.003 0.003 0.193
Div3*  -0.009            0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.712
Div5*  -0.011            0.004 0.012 0.000 0.003 0.950
Div6*  -0.007            0.004 0.068 0.000 0.003 0.983
Div7*  0.004            0.007 0.500 0.004 0.004 0.359
Div8*  0.017            0.015 0.253 0.003 0.005 0.606
Div9*  0.000            0.007 0.955 0.001 0.004 0.895
Year85*  0.008            0.010 0.414 0.001 0.003 0.746
Year86*  0.022            0.014 0.125 -0.002 0.003 0.471
Year87*  0.013            0.011 0.242 0.008 0.005 0.121
Year88*  0.006            0.008 0.452 -0.001 0.003 0.562
Year89*  0.009            0.010 0.408 0.001 0.003 0.838
Year90*  0.015            0.010 0.165 -0.002 0.002 0.359
Year91*  0.013            0.010 0.203 -0.003 0.002 0.211
Year92*  0.001            0.007 0.906 -0.002 0.002 0.382
Year93*  -0.005            0.005 0.338 -0.003 0.002 0.181
Year94*  -0.005            0.006 0.401 -0.001 0.003 0.798
Year95*  0.009            0.011 0.419 -0.004 0.002 0.020
Year96*  0.006            0.009 0.505 -0.001 0.003 0.644
Year97*  0.015            0.011 0.188 -0.006 0.001 0.000
Year98*  0.016            0.012 0.188 0.002 0.003 0.634
Year99*  0.005            0.010 0.608 0.001 0.004 0.828
No. of Observations  8664           14154
Wald chi square  244.27          117.91
* denotes dummy variable effect is for discrete change from 0 to 1; pvalues for both Wald Chi squares are 0, standard errors are cluster corrected 
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Table 13  Out of sample prediction of effect sizes of population growth 
Prediction 











            
FP sample  0.022            -0.027*** 0.008 -0.010** 0.017* 
                   
NFP sample  0.037          -0.043***   0.008 -0.010** 0.023** 
                   
Whole sample  0.031            -0.037*** 0.008 -0.010** 0.027** 
Note :  
Standard errors calculated by delta method 
*    significant at 10% level 
**  significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
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Table 14 : Comparing marginal Effects when public hospitals are also included 
 For-profit (I)     Not-for-profit (I)  Public(I)  For-profit (II)        Not-for-profit (II) Public(II)
lnpropelderlypop80        -0.0027  0.0012  -0.0001 -0.0014 -0.0060 0.0038
 (0.0094)  (0.0032)          (0.0048) (0.0078) (0.0047) (0.0048)
lnpop80              0.0004 0.0017* -0.0021 0.0000 0.0015 -0.0010
            (0.0020)  (0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0019)
Log elderlypopgrowth  -0.0181*  0.0048          -0.0004 -0.0140* 0.0014 -0.0011
 (0.0106)  (0.0034)          (0.0065) (0.0085) (0.0039) (0.0053)
System membership  -0.0416***  0.0002  -0.0050        -0.0498*** -0.0014 -0.0062*
 (0.0065)  (0.0014)          (0.0032) (0.0088) (0.0015) (0.0032)
CON Law  -0.0035  -0.0016  -0.0003        -0.0115** -0.0018 0.0046
            (0.0052)  (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0055) (0.0029) (0.0036)
Lnwage80              -0.0320 -0.0155 -0.0225 -0.0307 -0.0146 -0.0062
            (0.0298)  (0.0115) (0.0201) (0.0309) (0.0122) (0.0196)
Lnwagegrowth              0.0653 0.0680*** -0.0054 0.0909** 0.0548*** -0.0022
 (0.0418)  (0.0145)          (0.0335) (0.0394) (0.0195) (0.0313)
lnpcy80              0.0171 0.0074 0.0103 0.0119 0.0052 -0.0037
            (0.0132)  (0.0056) (0.0118) (0.0126) (0.0081) (0.0103)
Logpcygrowth              0.0264* 0.0078 -0.0048 0.0133 0.0070 -0.0039
 (0.0143)  (0.0037)          (0.0077) (0.0158) (0.0047) (0.0079)
          
No  of  observations  3726            5298 1910 5543 9417 2777
Wald Chi Square  144.02  122.29          121.57 105.59 33.80 21.92
 
Note: 
Standard errors are cluster corrected. Year and division dummies taken as controls for specification1. Only region dummies taken as controls for specification II 
*    denotes 10% level of significance 
**   denotes 5% level of significance 




Table 15: Multinomial Logit: Marginal Effects on Probability of Hospital Exit 
  Variable Public    Not-for-profit  For-profit 
      
lnpropelderlypop80        -0.0407 -0.0237 0.06439
  (0.0424)      (0.1885) (0.1783)
lnpop80      -0.0377*** 0.0229  0.01479
  (0.0150)      (0.0438) (0.0450)
Log elderlypopgrowth  0.0694  0.4514*  -0.52078** 
  (0.0580)      (0.2411) (0.2331)
System membership  -0.0786***  0.1147  -0.03610 
  (0.0286)      (0.0729) (0.0730)
Con law  0.0027  0.2269*  -0.22966* 
  (0.0469)      (0.1197) (0.1345)
Lnwage80    0.0116  -0.0572  0.04561
  (0.1077)      (0.3452) (0.3571)
Lnwagegrowth    -0.2330  1.7711***  -1.53812***
  (0.2474)      (0.5380) (0.5917)
Lnpcy80        0.0777 0.0410 -0.11869
  (0.0861)      (0.2353) (0.2395)
Lnpcygrowth    -0.1818**  0.4949**  -0.31314
  (0.0825)      (0.2506) (0.2763)
Probability of Exit        0.035 0.258 0.707
Wald Chi Square  166.76     
No. of Observations  199     
     
Note: 
Standard errors are cluster corrected. Division dummies have been taken as controls. Exits, in only those county years that had all3 
types of hospitals, were considered. In this sample of hospitals, there were no for-profit exits in division 1, and no public hospital exits in 
divisions 1,3, and 8.  
*    denotes 10% level of significance 
**   denotes 5% level of significance 
 ***denotes 1% level of significance 
 
 
 Appendix: Variables 
 
 
Lnpop80 :     log of county population in 1980 
Lnpopgr :     log(county pop2000)- log(countypop80) 
lnpropelderlypop80:   proportion of total population in a county which is 65+ 
log elderlypopgrowth  log(county elderly pop in 2000)-log(county elderly population in 1980) 
 
Lnwg80:     Wage index of hospitals in year 1990 
Lnwagegrowth:     log growth in hospital wage index over 1990-2000 
 
Lnpcy80:    log(per capita income in 1980) 
logpcygrowth:     log change in per capita income over 1980-2000 
 
System:      dummy variable =1 if hospital belongs to a system 
 
 
div1      NE: New England  
div2      MA: Middle Atlantic  
div3      ENC: East North Central  
div4    WNC:  West  North  Central 
div5      SA: South Atlantic  
div6      ESC: East South Central 
div7      WSC: West South Central 
div8    Mnt:  Mountain 
div9    Pac.  Pacific: 
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